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Abstract. Ring signatures, introduced by Rivest, Shamir and Tauman, attest the
fact that one member from a ring of signers has endorsed the message but no one
can identify who from the ring is actually responsible for its generation. It was de-
signed canonically for secret leaking. Since then, various applications have been
discovered. For instance, it is a building block of optimistic fair exchange, des-
tinated verifier signatures and ad-hoc key exchange. Interestingly, many of these
applications require the signer to create a ring signature on behalf of two possible
signers (a two-party ring signature) only. An efficient two-party ring signature
scheme due to Bender, Katz, and Morselli, is known. Unfortunately, it cannot
be used in many of the aforementioned applications since it is secure only in a
weaker model. In this paper, we revisit their construction and proposed a scheme
that is secure in the strongest sense. In addition, we extend the construction to
a two-party blind ring signature. Our proposals are secure in the standard model
under well-known number-theoretic assumptions. Finally, we discuss the applica-
tions of our construction, which include designated verifier signatures, optimistic
fair exchange and fair outsourcing of computational task.
1 Introduction
The notion of ring signatures, introduced by Rivest, Shamir and Tauman [14], is a
group-oriented signature which takes into account privacy concerns. A user can au-
tonomously sign on behalf of a group, while group members can be totally unaware
of being included in the group. Any verifier can be assured that a message has been
endorsed by one of the members in this group, but the actual identity of the signer
remains hidden. Unlike group signatures [6], there is no group manager and no revo-
cation. Following the terminology, the group is usually called a ring since the original
proposal arrange the group members in a ring during the process of signature genera-
tion. The formation of the ring is spontaneous and the original motivation is for Whistle
Blowing.
If the ring consists of two members only, the resulting signature is called a two-
party ring signature, which is the focus of this paper. The reason is that most of the
applications of ring signatures only require a ring size of 2. Nonetheless, even with this
? This work is supported by ARC Future Fellowship FT0991397.
2 Man Ho Au and Willy Susilo
relaxation, construction in the standard model under well-established assumption still
remains daunting.
Chow et al. [8] gave a construction with a formal security analysis in the standard
model under a new assumption. The general version of Bender et al. [2] uses generic
ZAPs for NP as a building block and is inefficient. They also proposed an efficient two-
party ring signature scheme under standard assumptions in a weaker security model.
Shacham and Waters [17] proposed an efficient ring signature scheme without using
random oracles but anonymity is computational and required a trusted setup assump-
tion. Chandran et al. [4] presented a scheme in the untrusted common reference string
model while providing “heuristically statistical” anonymity. Schäge and Schwenk [16]
provided another ring signature scheme in the standard model using basic assumptions,
again, in a weaker security model. Recently, Ghadafi [9] offered both ring signatures
and blind ring signatures in the standard model. Again, the anonymity is computational
and required a trusted setup assumption.
As mentioned, the focus of our paper is on two-party ring signatures. We start from
the specific construction due to Bender et al. due to its simplicity and efficiency. All
other existing schemes employ non-interactive proof of some sort in the signature and
it is hard to improve their efficiency. In addition, due to the use of non-interactive
proof, the anonymity is often computational due to the use of the Groth-Sahai proof
system [11] which requires a trusted setup for the common reference string. The major
issue with Bender et al.’s two-party ring signature scheme is its insecurity under the
chosen key model where an attacker is allowed to generate its own public key. An at-
tack of this kind in this model is presented in [17]. This limits the use of this scheme
as a building block in a larger system involving multiple users who could be malicious
and are allowed to generate their own keys.
We observe that the problem can be solved if all the keys introduced by the attackers
are “certified” to be properly generated. In other words, if we require all users to make
a zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge of the secret keys, the system could be proven
secure. For if this is the case, the simulator in the security proof could “extract” the
secret key for each public key presented by the adversary and uses this key to answer
the query. The only remaining issue is that the prove has to be non-interactive so that
it could be viewed as part of this public key. In this regard, we make use of the proof
system from Groth-Sahai and present two useful non-interactive protocols as building
blocks. The advantage of our approach is that these complex non-interactive proof are
only added as part of the public key which only needs to be verified once in practice.
Thus, our proposal retains most of the computational advantage of the two-party ring
signature scheme from Bender et al. Finally, we equip our scheme with a blind signature
generation protocol. We believe our construction can be used as a building block for
many larger systems.
1.1 Our Contribution
1. We present efficient non-interactive zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge protocols
for discrete logarithm and commitment.
2. We present an efficient two-party ring signature construction in the standard model
and equip it with a blind signing procedure.
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3. We discuss various applications of two-party (blind) ring signatures.
Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2, we review the
syntax of a two-party (blind) ring signature scheme its security definitions. We present
two non-interactive zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge protocols in Sec. 3. Based on
our protocols, we present an efficient construction of two-party ring signatures and its
blind version in Sec. 4. We discuss various applications of our proposal in Sec. 5 before
concluding our paper in Sec. 6.
2 Preliminary
If n is a positive integer, we use [n] to denote the set {1, . . . , n}. We review the follow-
ing well-known computational assumptions.
Definition 1 (DL Assumption). Let G = 〈g〉 be a cyclic group of prime order p. The
discrete logarithm assumption states that given a tuple (g, Z) ∈ (G,G), it is computa-
tionally infeasible to compute the value z ∈ Zp such that Z = gz .
Definition 2 (CDH Assumption). Let G = 〈g〉 be a cyclic group of prime order p.
The computational Diffie-Hellman assumption states that given a tuple (g, ga, gb) ∈
(G,G,G), it is computationally infeasible to compute the value gab.
Definition 3 (DLIN Assumption). Let G = 〈g〉 be a cyclic group of prime order p. The
decision linear (DLIN) assumption states that given a tuple (u, v, w, ua, vb, T ) ∈ (G,
G, G, G, G, G), it is computationally infeasible to decide if T = wa+b.
2.1 Bilinear Pairing
Let G,GT be two cyclic groups of the same prime order p. Let g be a generator of G.
A mapping ê : G×G→ GT is a bilinear pairing if the following are true:
– (Unique Representation) Each element of G and GT has a unique binary represen-
tation.
– (Bilinear) For all a, b ∈ Zp, ê(ga, gb) = ê(g, g)ab.
– (Non-degenerate) ê(g, g) 6= 1GT , where 1GT is the identity element of the group
GT .
The setting we present here is often referred to as a symmetric pairing. We abuse
the notation and use 1 to represent the identity element regardless of the group. For
example, we will use 1 to represent 1GT in the subsequent text.
2.2 Groth-Sahai Non-Interactive Witness-Indistinguishable Proof System
We briefly review the non-interactive witness-indistinguishable proof system developed
by Groth and Sahai [11] (referred to as GS proof hereafter). They gave three instantia-
tions and we employ the version that depends on the decision linear assumption since
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it is often regarded as the weakest assumption amongst the three and works in the sym-
metric pairing setting.
Consider a set of variables {Xi}ni=1 ∈ Gn and public constants {Ai}ni=1 ∈ Gn,
{bi,j ∈ Zp}i,j∈[n], tT ∈ GT . A pairing product equation is of the form:
n∏
i=1
ê(Xi, Ai)
n∏
i=1
n∏
j=1
ê(Xi, Xj)
xi,j = tT .
The GS proof system requires a common reference string which allows a prover
to make commitments of a set of variables {Xi}. It also allows the prover to produce
an non-interactive proof that these committed variables satisfy a set of pairing product
equations. The proof is witness-indistinguishable in the sense the the proof generated
by one set of variables is indistinguishable to another. There are two kinds of common
reference string in a GS proof system, namely, soundness string and simulation string.
The former allows the string creator to open the “commitments” and thus guarantees the
soundness of the system. The latter provides perfectly hiding commitments and guaran-
tees witness-indistinguishably. These two strings are computationally indistinguishable.
As an example, consider a variable X and a constants A and the following pairing
product equation:
ê(X,X)ê(X,A) = 1.
A GS proof of a variable X satisfying the above equation could be produced using
X = 1 or X = A−1 and the proofs produced by these two values (often called wit-
nesses) are indistinguishable. Indeed, proof of satisfaction of the above equation would
assure the verifier that either X = 1 or X = A−1.
Throughout this paper, we will use the following notation to represent a GS proof of
knowledge of variables satisfying a set of pairing product equations. All symbols that
appear on the left hand side inside the brackets are variables while all other symbols
on the right hand side after the colon are the public constants of the pairing product
equations. For example,
NIWI
{
(X1, X2, X3) :
ê(X1, X1)ê(X1, A) = 1 ∧
ê(X1, X2)ê(X2, X3) = T
}
means a proof of the variables X1, X2, X3 that satisfies the two equations, with A and
T being public constants.
2.3 Syntax of Two-Party Ring Signatures
We adapt the definitions and security models of ring signatures from various litera-
tures. A ring signature scheme in the common reference string model consists of four
algorithms, namely, Setup, Gen, Sign, Verify, whose functions are enumerated below.
param ← Setup(1λ): On input a security parameter λ, this algorithm outputs the
public parameter param for the system. We assume param is an implicit input to all
algorithms listed below.
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(pk, sk)← Gen(): This algorithm outputs a key pair (pk, sk) for a signer. If (pk, sk) is
an output of the algorithm Gen(), we say pk is the corresponding public key of sk
(and vice versa).
(σ,R) ← Sign(skS ,R,m) : On input a message m, a secret key of a signer skS
(whose public key is pkS) and a set public keys R with pkS ∈ R, this algorithm
outputs a signature σ, which is a ring signature of m with respect to the ringR.
valid/invalid← Verify(σ,R,m) : On input a public key a message m, a signa-
ture σ with a set of public keysR, this algorithm verifies the signature and outputs
valid/invalid.
A ring signature scheme must possess Correctness, Unforgeability and Anonmity,
to be reviewed below.
Correctness. For any security parameter λ and param ← Setup(1λ), (pkS , skS) ←
Gen() andR = {pk1, . . ., pkn} such that (pki, ski)← Gen() for i ∈ [n] with pkS ∈ R.
For any message m, if (σ,R)← Sign(skS ,R,m), then valid← Verify(σ,R, m).
In this paper, our focus is on two-party ring signature. That is, |R| = 2 for all
signatures.
Unforgeability. The following game between a challenger C and an adversary A for-
mally captures the requirement of Unforgeability.
Setup C invokes Setup(1λ) and subsequently Gen() to obtain (param, {(pki, ski)}i∈[n]).
Denote the set {pki}i∈[n] byR. (param, pkS ,R) is given to A.
Query A is allowed to make the following queries:
– Corruption Query. A submits a public key pki ∈ R and receives ski.
– Signature Query. A submits a message m, an arbitrary ring R′ = {pk′0, pk
′
1}
and a bit b, and receives (σ, R′) ← Sign(sk′b, R′, m) where sk′b is the corre-
sponding private key of pk′b.
Output A submits (σ∗,R∗,m∗) and wins if and only if
1. valid← Verify(σ∗,R∗, m∗) andR∗ ⊂ R.
2. A has not submitted a Signature Query with input m∗,R∗.
3. A has not submitted a Corruption Query on input pk such that pk ∈ R∗.
Definition 4 (Unforgeability). A two-party ring signature scheme is unforgeable if no
PPT adversary wins the above game with non-negligible probability.
Our definition of unforgeability is slightly stronger than the strongest notion, ex-
istential unforgeability with respect to insider corruption [2], in which we allow the
adversary to issue signature query on behalf of arbitrary ring without supplying the
corresponding secret key.
Anonymity. It means that given a message m and a signature (σ,R), it is infeasible to
determine who created the signature, even if all the secret keys are known. The formal
definition is adapted from [2] for general ring signatures against full key exposure. Note
that we allow the common reference string to be maliciously generated in this model.
The following game between a challenger C and an adversary A formally captures
the requirement of Anonymity.
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Setup A gives param to C. C invokes Gen() to obtain {(pki, ski)}i∈[n]). Denote the set
{pki}i∈[n] byR. (pki, ski) for i ∈ [n]) is given to A.
Challenge A gives two indexes i0, i1 and a message m to C. C filps a fair coin b and
computes (σ, {pki0 , pki1})← Sign(skb,m{pki0 , pki1}). σ is returned to A.
Output A submits a guess bit b′ and wins if and only if b′ = b.
Definition 5 (Anonymity). A two-party ring signature is unconditionally anonymous
if no computationally unbounded adversray A wins the above game with probability
that is non-negligibly higher than 1/2.
2.4 Syntax of Two-Party Blind Ring Signatures
A signature is blind if there exists a protocol between the signer and a user in which
the user obtains a signature from the signer on message m in such a way that the signer
learns nothing about the m nor the signature issued. More formally, a blind signature
scheme is a scheme with the following additional protocol BSign.
Setup, Gen, Verify are the same as above.
BSign : This is a protocol between the signer and a user. The common input is param
and a ring of two public keysR = (pk0, pk1). The signer has additionally a private
input a private key (skb) such that the corresponding public key (pkb) is in the ring
R. The user has a private input m. Upon successful completion of the protocol, the
user obtains a ring signature σ on message m with respect to ringR.
Unforgeability. The following game between a challenger C and an adversary A for-
mally captures the requirement of Unforgeability for any two-party blind ring signa-
tures.
Setup C invokes Setup(1λ) and subsequently Gen() to obtain (param, {(pki, ski)}i∈[n]).
Denote the set {pki}i∈[n] byR. (param, pkS ,R) is given to A.
Query A is allowed to make the following queries:
– Corruption Query. A submits a public key pki ∈ R and receives ski.
– Blind Sign Query. A submits an arbitrary ring R′ = {pk′0, pk
′
1} and a bit b,
and interacts with C who plays the role of a signer (with public key pk′b and
secret key sk′b).
Output A submits a ringR∗ and (k+ 1) distinct messages (m∗i ) and their correspond-
ing signatures (σ∗i ) for i = 1 to k + 1 and wins if and only if
1. R∗ ⊂ R and A has not submitted a Corruption Query on input pk such that
pk ∈ R∗.
2. valid← Verify(σ∗i ,R∗, m∗i ) for i = 1 to k + 1.
3. A has submitted at most k blind sign queries with inputR∗.
Definition 6 (Unforgeability). A two-party blind ring signature scheme is unforgeable
if no PPT adversary wins the above game with non-negligible probability.
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Anonymity Anonymity for the blind version is shown as follows.
The following game between a challenger C and an adversary A formally captures
the requirement of Anonymity.
Setup A gives param to C. C invokes Gen() to obtain {(pki, ski)}i∈[n]). Denote the set
{pki}i∈[n] byR. C gives (pki, ski) for i ∈ [n] to A.
Challenge A gives two indexes i0, i1 to C. C filps a fair coin b and interacts with A as
a signer in protocol BSign with private input skib .
Output A submits a guess bit b′ and wins if and only if b′ = b.
Definition 7 (Anonymity). A two-party blind ring signature is unconditionally anony-
mous if no computationally unbounded adversray A wins the above game with proba-
bility that is non-negligibly higher than 1/2.
Blindness Blindness refers to the fact that the signer learns nothing about the mes-
sage being signed nor the signature created during a blind sign protocol. The following
game between a challenger C and an adversary A formally captures the requirement of
Blindness.
Setup C invokes Setup() and subsequently Gen() to obtain param, {(pki, ski)}i∈[n]).
Denote the set {pki}i∈[n] byR. C gives param and (pki, ski) for i ∈ [n] to A.
Challenge A gives a ring R∗ ⊂ R and two messages m0, m1 to C. C filps a fair coin
b and obtains two signatures from A in protocol BSign in the following order: the
first interaction is to obtain signature on message mb and the second interaction
is for signature on message m1−b. C gives σ0, σ1 to A which are the resulting
signatures from these interactions. Note that the index i is arbitrary, meaning that
σi could be the result from the first run or the second interaction. Further, σi =⊥ if
the interaction does not terminate successfully.
Output A submits a guess bit b′ and wins if and only if b′ = b.
Definition 8 (Blindness). A two-party blind ring signature is blind if no PPT adversray
A wins the above game with probability that is non-negligibly higher than 1/2.
3 Non-Interative Zero-Knowledge Proof-of-Knowledge
Our construction relies on an non-interactive zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge of
discrete logarithm satisfying the requirement of what is commonly referred to as signa-
ture proof-of-knowledge. More formally, it has to be simulatable and extractable under
the same common reference string. Being simulatable means that given a trapdoor of the
common reference string, there exists an efficient algorithm, called simulator, which is
capable of simulating a proof-of-knowledge of discrete logarithm of an element with-
out actually knowing the discrete logarithm. Being extractable means that given the
trapdoor of the common reference string, there exists another efficient algorithm, called
extractor, which is capable of outputting the discrete logarithm of an element given a
proof-of-knowledge of discrete logarithm of that element.
Many secure constructions requires a proof system that allows simulations and ex-
traction under the same string and this is not readily achievable in the GS proof system.
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Nonetheless, Bernhard et al. [3], following the technique employed in [10], showed
how a GS proof for pairing product equations can be turned into signature of knowl-
edges offering simulatability and extractability simultaneously. Our protocol follows
their concept and the difference is discussed after the presentation of the protocol.
3.1 Proof PDL
We use the notation PDL{(x) : Y = gx} to represent an non-interactive zero-knowledge
proof-of-knowledge of the discrete logarithm of Y to base g. The protocol makes use
of the GS witness-indistinguishable proof system on a set of pairing-product equations.
Our protocol is inspired by various constructions in the literature and we introduce sev-
eral optimizations for efficiency considerations.
Setup Let n be the security parameter. The common reference string of PDL consists
of crsGS, the soundness string of the GS proof system, and the following elements
v′, v1, . . . , vn, h1, h2 ∈ G and a collision-resistant hash function H : {0, 1}∗ →
Zp.
Proof Generation Intuition We first present the intuition of the non-interactive proof
of knowledge of x such that Y = gx. The prover first express x as
∑n−1
i=0 2
ix[i]
where x[n − 1] . . . x[0] is the binary representation of x. The prover generates a
witness-indistinguishable proof of the following fact:
NIWI
(X0, . . . , Xn−1, S1) :
(∧n−1
i=0 (Xi = g
2i ∨Xi = 1) ∧
Y =
∏n−1
i=0 Xi ∧
)
∨(
ê(S1, h) = ê(h1, h2)ê(V(statement), S2)
)

where V(statement) is the waters hash of the statement being proved. Specifically,
let C be the commitments of the witnesses of {Xi}’s in the GS proof system. Fur-
ther, let s = H(C||Y ||S2) and V(statement) is defined as v′
∏
v
s[i]
i where s[i]
is the i-th bit of s. The idea of the proof is that Xi = g2
i
if x[i] is 1 and Xi = 1
(the identity element of G) if x[i] = 0. Due to the soundness of the GS proof
system, knowing the set of Xi’s implies knowing a set of values x[i] ∈ {0, 1}.
Since the later part assures the verifier that Y =
∏n−1
i=0 Xi, knowing a set of val-
ues x[i] ∈ {0, 1} is equivalent to knowing the value x =
∑n−1
i=0 x[i] such that
Y = gx. One could view the final equation as knowing a Waters’ signature on the
statement. In fact, (S1, S2) is a Waters’ signature on the value s = H(C||Y ||S2).
This is purely for the simulatablility of the proof as the simulator who generates the
common reference string knows the “secret key” (α) such that h1 = hα would be
capable of generating (S1, S2) and use it for the proof simulation. Due to witness-
indistinguishability of the GS proof system, the simulated proof is indistinguishable
to the proof generating using witness {Xi}. The remaining challenge is to trans-
form the above idea into a set of pairing-product equations where the GS proof
system can be used.
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Proof Generation The prover randomly picks r ∈R Zp, computes S2 = hr1 ∈ G and
computes the following GS proof.
NIWI
(X0, . . . , Xn−1, S1, S) :
ê(S/h, S/h1) = 1 ∧∧n−1
i=0 (ê(Xi, Xi/g
2i) = 1) ∧
ê(Y, S/h) = ê(
∏n−1
i=0 Xi, S/h) ∧
ê(S1, S) = ê(h2, h1)ê(V(statement), S2)

using the set of witnesses {Xi = gx[i]2
i}, S = h1, S1 = V(statement)hr2. Again,
let C be the commitments of {Xi}’s and S in the GS proof system. Let s =
H(C||Y ||S2) and V(statement) is defined as v′
∏
v
s[i]
i where s[i] is the i-th bit
of s.
Proof Verification The verifier validates the NIWI proof and that S2 6= 1.
Discussions Various optimization techniques have been employed for the realization
of PDL. Firstly, one could note that the variable S acts as a selector. The first equa-
tion guarantees that S = h or S = h1. When S = h1, the prover can simulate the
last equation without knowing the Waters signature on the statement as shown above.
Specifically, the prover can set S2 = hr1 and use the witness S1 = V(statement)hr2. In
this setting, the prover is forced to setXi to be gx[i]2
i
so that the equation ê(Y, h1/h) =
ê(
∏n
i=0Xi, h1/h) holds. Finally, one could note that the equation ê(Xi, Xi/g
2i) = 1
guarantees that Xi = 1 or g2
i
.
To produce a simulated proof, the simulator would have to generate the common
reference string so that it knows α such that h1 = hα. With this trapdoor (α), the
simulator could set Xi = 1, S = h so that all but the last equation holds. For the
last equation, the simulator creates a Waters signature on the statement. Specifically, it
randomly picks r ∈R Zp, computes S2 = hr and S1 = hα2V(statement)r.
While the general idea is similar to that of [3] in the construction of signature proof
of knowledge, our realization contains several optimizations. Firstly, only part of the
Waters’ signature (S1) is a variable. The reason is that S2 can be computed without
knowing the signing key and can be “simulated” by the real prover. Secondly, we make
use of the symmetric pairing to save the number of variables for the “OR” proofs. For
instance, proving the knowledge of variable X satisfying the relation e(X/A,X/B) =
1 is equivalent to proving X = A or X = B with one pairing-product equation in one
variable.
3.2 Proof PWH
Let g, u1, . . . , un ∈ G be generators of group G. Consider a message m ∈ Zp, we
consider the commitment ofm as
∏n
i=1 u
m[i]
i g
r for a random value r ∈R Zp wherem[i]
is the i-th bit ofm. We use the notation PWH{(m, r) : M =
∏n
i=1 u
m[i]
i g
r} to represent
the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge of how the commitmentM can
be openned.
Common Reference String is the same as the proof PDL.
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Proof Generation The prover randomly picks t ∈R Zp, computes S2 = ht1 ∈ G and
computes the following GS proof.
NIWI

R0, . . . , Rn−1,U1, . . . , Un,
S1, S
 :
ê(S/h, S/h1) = 1 ∧∧n
i=1(ê(Ui, Ui/ui) = 1) ∧∧n−1
i=0 (ê(Ri, Ri/g
2i) = 1) ∧
ê(M,S/h) = ê(
∏n
i=1 Ui
∏n−1
i=0 Ri, S/h) ∧
ê(S1, S) = ê(h2, h1)ê(V(statement), S2)

using the set of witnesses {Ri = gr[i]2
i}, {Ui = um[i]i }, S = h1, S1 = V(statement)ht2.
Here r[n− 1] . . . r[0] is the binary representation of r. Again, let C be the commit-
ments of {Ri}’s, {Ui}’s and S in the GS proof system. Let s = H(C||M ||S2) and
V(statement) is defined as v′
∏
v
s[i]
i where s[i] is the i-th bit of s.
Proof Verification The verifier validates the NIWI proof and that S2 6= 1.
Regarding the security of these two non-interactive proofs, we have the following
theorem whose proof can be found in Appendix A.
Theorem 1. PDL and PWH are simulatable under the DLIN assumption and extractable
under the CDH assumption in the standard model.
4 Constructions
We first describe our construction of a two-party ring signature, which is essentially the
scheme from [2] with a proof-of-correctness added to the public key.
4.1 A Two-Party Ring Signature Scheme
param ← Setup(1λ): On input a security parameter λ, this algorithm chooses two
cyclic groups G, GT of prime order p such that |p| = λ and that there exists a
bilinear map ê : G × G → GT . It also generates the common reference string of
the non-interactive proof system discussed in section 3. Finally, it chooses several
generator g, u′, u1, . . . , un ∈ G, where n is the bit-length of the message.
(pk, sk) ← Gen(): This algorithm randomly picks x ∈R Zp and computes Y = gx.
It also computes the non-interactive proof πY = PDL{(x) : Y = gx}. The public
key is (Y, πY ) and the secret key is x.
(σ,R)← Sign(skS ,R,m) : On input a message m, a secret key of a signer x and two
public keys (Y, πY ) and (Y ′, πY ′) where Y = gx, this algorithm first validates πY ′ .
Next, it computesM = u′
∏n
i=1 u
m[i]
i . It then chooses r ∈R Zp, computes S2 = gr
and S1 = Y ′xMr. Output σ as (S1, S2) and the ring as {(Y, πY ), (Y ′, πY ′)}.
valid/invalid← Verify(σ,R,m) : On input a a message m, a signature σ and a
rinf {(Y, πY ), (Y ′, πY ′)}, this algorithm first validates πY and πY ′ . Next, it outputs
valid if and only if
ê(S1, g) = ê(Y, Y
′)ê(u′
n∏
i=1
u
m[i]
i , S2).
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Note that the signature size is only 2 elements. While the validations of πY and πY ′
is quite expensive, it is required to be conducted once per each public key. Thus, in a
long run, our scheme is nearly as efficient as the original scheme from [2] if the public
key of the users are relatively stable.
4.2 A Blind Signature Generation Protocol for our Two-Party Ring Signature
Scheme
The blind signature generation protocol is a two-round protocol described below. The
public keys of the ring, (Y, πY ) and (Y ′, πY ′) are known to both the signer and the user.
Without loss of generality, the signer has an additional input x such that Y = gx. The
user has an additional input m.
The user validates (Y, πY ) and (Y ′, πY ′). Then it computes a commitment of m as
M ′ =
∏n
i=1 u
m[i]
i g
r for some random r ∈R Zp and the non-interactive proof
πM ′ = PWH{(m, r) : M ′ =
∏n
i=1 u
m[i]
i g
r}. It sends M ′, πM ′ to the signer.
Upon receive M ′, πM ′ , the signer validates πM ′ and πY ′ . Next, it computes S2 = gt
for some randomly generated t ∈R Zp, S1 = Y ′x(u′M ′)t and returns (S′1, S′2) to
the user.
The user picks a ∈R Zp, computes S1 = (S′1/(S′2)r)(u′M ′)a and S2 = S′2ga. It
outputs the signature on m as (S1, S2).
It is straightforward to see that the signature created using the blind signature gen-
eration protocol has the same distribution as those outputted from the sign algorithm.
Regarding the security of our two-party ring signatures, we have the following the-
orem whose proof can be found in Appendix B.
Theorem 2. Our construction of two-party ring signatures is unforgeable under the
DLIN and CDH assumption. It is unconditionally anonymous. The blind signature ver-
sion possesses blindness under the DLIN and CDH assumption.
5 Applications
Designated Verifier Signatures A direct application of our two-party ring signature
scheme is on designated verifier signatures, Jakobsson, Sako and Impagliazzo [13], and
independently by Chaum [5] in 1996. A DVS scheme allows a signer Alice to convince a
designated verifier Bob that Alice has endorsed the message while Bob cannot transfer
this conviction to anyone else. As discussed in [15], if Alice create a ring signature
on behalf of the ring with Alice and Bob and sends the ring signature to Bob, Bob
will be convinced that the message has been endorsed by Alice. On the other hand, the
signature will not be able to convince any outsider since Bob could have been the creater
of the signature. Hence, a two-party ring signature is sufficient for the construction of
designated verifier signature. Our construction secure in the strong model is necessary
for it allows the resulting designated verifier signatures to be secure against the vogue
key attack [13, 18]. On the other hand, some existing schemes make use of some ad-hoc
techniques [20] to defend against this attack.
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Optimistic Fair Exchange Optimistic fair exchange, introduced by Asokan, Schunter
and Waidner [1] allows two parties, Alice and Bob, to exchange digital signatures with
the help of a passive trusted third party. Haung et al. [12] presents an elegant realization
based on a secure two-party ring signatures. Their construction is generic in which any
secure two-party ring signature scheme can be used. Having said that, since optimistic
fair exchange is supposed to work in the multi-user setting, the security requirement of
the underlying ring signature is stronger than the model guaranteed by the two-party
ring signatures in [2]. On the other hand, our scheme satisfies their security require-
ments and can be used. We also make the following observation. If the blind version
of our ring signature scheme is employed, the resulting optimistic fair exchange proto-
col enjoys an additional property in which the trusted third party cannot learn anything
about the messages and signatures being exchanged even if it is called upon for protocol
completion. This will improve the applicability of this protocol since they exchanging
parties might be reluctant to reveal the information of the exchange.
Fair Outsourcing Following the fair exchange paradigm, Chen et al. [7] consider the
problem of the exchange of payment and outsourcing computation. In their proposal,
the job owner outsourced some computationally expensive task to a set of workers and
upon completion of its assigned computation, the worker shall receive the payment
from the job owner. A fair exchange protocol is used to ensure fairness. Specifically, the
computation result is used in exchange of the job owner’s payment. As a two-party ring
signature can be used as a building block for a fair exchange protocol, our construction
is also useful in the fair outsourcing system.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we present two useful non-interactive zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge
protocols. With these protocols, we proposed an efficient two-party ring signatures and
its extension to support blind signature generation. Finally, we discussed several appli-
cations of our constructions.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
We sketch the proof idea for PDL. The proof for PWH is similar and is thus omitted.
Simulatability In the intuition of PDL, we already discussed how a simulator, with the
knowledge of α such that h1 = hα can produce a simulated proof PDL. It remains to
argue this simulated proof is indistinguishable from the real proof. The argument makes
use of the game-hoping technique [19] which involves a sequence of games defined
below.
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1. Game0: This is the real game.
2. Game1: Same is Game0 except the common reference string of the GS proof system
crsGS is chosen in the simulation setting instead of the soundness setting.
3. Game2: Same as Game1 except the non-interactive proofs PDL given to the adver-
sary is generated by the simulator.
4. Game3: Same as Game2 except the common reference string of the GS proof sys-
tem crsGS is chosen to be in the soundness setting instead of the simulation setting.
The setting in Game3 is where the adversary is given simulated proofs instead of real
proofs. It remains to show the advantage of an adversary trying to distinguish whether
it is playing Game0 and Game3 is negligible. The argument goes as follows. The differ-
ence between Game0 and Game1 is negligible under the DLIN assumption due to the
computational indistinguishably of the common reference string of the GS proof sys-
tem. For Game1 and Game2, observe that the distribution of S2 is the same (uniformly
at random from G) and that the distribution of the GS proof is also the same (since
the commitments are perfectly hiding in the simulation string), the difference between
Game1 and Game2 is negligible. Finally, the difference between Game2 and Game3
is negligible under the DLIN assumption. Thus, PDL is simulatable under the DLIN
assumption.
Extractability Due to the soundness of the GS proof system, the extractor can always
extracts from PDL a set of witnesses (X0, . . . , Xn−1, S1, S) satisfying the set of pairing
product equations. From the equation
ê(S/h, S/h1) = 1,
S can only be h or h1. If S = h, the last equation
ê(S1, S) = ê(h2, h1)ê(V(statement), S2)
means that the witness S1 together with the value S2 is a Waters signature on the mes-
sage “statement”. Since the adversary must be producing a new statement. It is easy
to setup the simulator which breaks the existential unforgeability of Waters signature,
which is equivalent to solve the CDH problem. (The simulator is given a signing oracle
of the Waters signature and use it to produce all the simulated proof. Finally, we then
adversary produces a new proof, the simulator extracts a new Waters signature.)
When S = h1, we have
ê(Y, S/h) = ê(
n−1∏
i=0
Xi, S/h),
which implies Y =
∏n−1
i=0 Xi. Recall that for all i,
ê(Xi, Xi/g
2i) = 1,
it means Xi = 1 or Xi = g2
i
. From this, the simulator can calculate x =
∑n−1
i=0 x[i]2
i
where x[i] = 0 if Xi = 1 and x[i] = 2i otherwise.
Thus, PDL is extractable under the CDH assumption.
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B Proof of Theorem 2
We sketch the proof idea for our construction of two-party (blind) ring signatures.
Unforgeability The signature generation and verification is the same as the construction
of [2], which is unforgeable against chosen sub-ring attack. The only difference is the
addition of the non-interactive proof of knowledge of the secret key attached in the
public key. For all public keys presented by the adversary, the simulator can extract the
corresponding signing keys and use it to answer all queries related to these keys chosen
by the adversary. This in turns allow our scheme to be proven secure in the stronger
model where the adversary can introduce keys into the system. For the blind signature
generation protocol, the simulator can always extract from PWH the message to be
signed in the protocol and the rest is the same as the origin version. Due to the need to
produce a simulated proof for the challenge public key and the need of extractions, our
construction is secure under the CDH and the DLIN assumption in the standard model.
Anonymity The original two-party ring signature of [2] is unconditionally anonymous
and it is straightforward to see our construction retains this desirable property. Consider
a given signature (S1, S2), {PK,PK ′} on message m. For any public key PK =
(Y, πY ), there exists a random value r such that S1 = gyy
′
(u′
∏m
i=1 u
m[i]
i )
r and S2 =
gr. In other words, it can be generated by user with public key PK or PK ′ and thus
the signature is unconditionally anonymous.
Blindness Consider two transcripts of the blind signature generation protocol (M ′,
πM ′ , S′1, S
′
2) and (M̄ ′, πM̄ ′ , S̄′1,S̄
′
2) and a given message-signature pair (m,S1, S2).
There exists a set of randomness (r, a) such that M ′ =
∏n
i=1 u
m[i]
i g
r, S2 = S′2g
a
and S1 = (u′M ′)aS′1/(S
′
2)
r (this only holds when S′1, S
′
2 are correctly computed by
the signer for M ′ yet if the signer does not, the user can detect this misbehavior and
abort).
At the same time, there exists another set of randomness (r̄, ā) such that M ′ =∏n
i=1 u
m[i]
i g
r̄, S2 = S̄′2g
ā and S1 = (u′M ′)āS̄′1/(S̄
′
2)
r̄ (again, assume S′1 and S
′
2 are
correctly computed).
This means that a message-signature pair can be the result of interaction M ′, S′1, S
′
2
or M̄ ′, S̄′1, S̄
′
2. Finally, due to the simulatablility of PWH, πM ′ nor πM̄ ′ leaks no infor-
mation about m and r under the DLIN and CDH assumption. Thus, our construction
possesses blindness under the DLIN and CDH assumption.
